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ABSTRACT
This paper develops a new instrumental-variable (IV) approach to estimate the effects of
different exchange rate regimes on bilateral outcomes. The basic idea is that the characteristics of
the exchange rate regime between two countries (exchange rate variability, fixed or float,
autonomous or common currencies) are partially related to the independent decisions of these
countries to peg —explicitly or de facto— to a third currency, notably that of a main anchor. Our
approach is to use this component of the exchange rate regime as an IV in regressions of bilateral
outcomes. We illustrate the methodology with one specific application: the economic e.ects of
currency unions. The likelihood that two countries independently adopt the currency of the same
anchor country is used as an instrument for whether they share or not a common currency. Three
findings stand out. First, sharing a common currency enhances trade supporting previous work by
Rose [2000]. Second, a common currency increases price co-movements; this finding is consistent
with the observation that a large part of the variation in real exchange rates is caused by fluctuations
in nominal exchange rates. Finally, a common currency decreases the co-movement of shocks to real
GDP. This is consistent with the view that currency unions lead to greater specialization.
Silvana Tenreyro Robert J. Barro






A vast empirical literature in international ﬁnance investigates the eﬀects of exchange rate
regimes on diﬀerent economic outcomes. For example, several studies have analyzed the
eﬀect of exchange rate variability on bilateral trade, foreign direct investment and relative
prices. Other studies have focused on the diﬀerential eﬀects of pegged-versus-ﬁxed exchange
rates (including stricter forms of ﬁxed-exchange rate regimes, such us currency boards or
currency unions). The underlying assumption in most studies is that exchange rate regimes
are randomly assigned and, hence, exogenous to the outcome variable under study. Standard
endogeneity problems, however, can hide the true eﬀect of exchange rate regimes in simple
OLS estimates. For example, the choice of exchange rate regimes might reﬂect omitted
characteristics that can also inﬂuence the economic outcome. Similarly, the adoption of a
certain regime might come with other (unmeasured) policies that also aﬀect the outcome.
The ﬁrst contribution of this paper is to develop an instrumental-variable (IV) approach
to address the endogeneity problem present in the estimation of the eﬀects of exchange
rate regimes on economic variables, such as bilateral capital ﬂows, trade volumes, and co-
movement of business cycles. As an illustration, consider two countries that exhibit a low
extent of exchange rate variability between them. There are several reasons for this low
variability. Some reasons might be related to the deliberate decision of facilitating trade
between the two countries, leading to a bias in OLS estimates of the eﬀe c to fe x c h a n g er a t e
variability on the volume of bilateral trade.1 Another reason, however, might be related to
1Typically, two countries that want to foster trade between themselves will also be more likely to under-
take other steps, such as reduction of bilateral tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers. To the extent that these steps
cannot be measured in the data, an OLS estimation will attribute all the credit to the low variability.
2the independent decisions of these two countries to keep a close parity with a third country’s
currency. In this case, the level of exchange rate variability between the two countries will
be exogenous to their bilateral trade. The methodology proposed in this study exploits
this triangular relationship with third countries to identify the economic eﬀect of diﬀerent
exchange rate regimes or features of exchange rates regimes (e.g. variability) on bilateral
outcomes. In particular, following this example, the methodology isolates the motive for low
(or high) variability that relates to the objective of pegging to a third currency and uses this
motivation as an IV for the extent of variability.
While the methodology developed in this paper can be applied to the analysis of diﬀerent
exchange rate arrangements, we illustrate it here with one speciﬁc application: the eﬀect of
currency unions on bilateral trade and on the extent of co-movement of output shocks and
price shocks.
Assessing the economic eﬀects of currency unions is imperative, given the recent devel-
opments in international monetary arrangements. Twelve Western European countries have
recently instituted the euro as their common currency. Sweden, Denmark and Britain have
opted out, but they might join in the near future. Several Eastern European countries are
debating the unilateral adoption of the euro as legal tender. Ecuador fully dollarized its
economy; El Salvador and Guatemala legalized the use of the U.S. dollar, and other govern-
ments in South and Central America are giving serious consideration to dollarization. Six
West African states have agreed to create a new common currency by the year 2003, and
eleven members of the Southern African Development Community are debating whether to
adopt the U.S. dollar or to create an independent monetary union possibly anchored to the
3South African rand.2 Finally, six oil-producing countries have expressed their intention to
form a currency union by 2010.3
A number of recent papers estimate the eﬀect of currency unions on bilateral trade.
Most notably, Rose [2000] and Frankel and Rose [2002] report that bilateral trade between
two countries that use the same currency is, controlling for other eﬀects, over two-hundred-
percent larger than bilateral trade between countries that use diﬀerent currencies. The
underlying assumption in these studies is that currency unions are randomly assigned. As
suggested before, unmeasured characteristics might create spurious links between currency-
union status and bilateral trade. For example, compatibility in legal systems, greater cultural
links, better infrastructure for bilateral transportation and tied bilateral transfers may in-
crease the propensity to share a common currency as well as encourage trade between two
countries. Similarly, countries willing to share a common currency may also take additional
(unmeasured) policies to foster integration and facilitate trade. These omitted character-
istics could lead to a positive bias in simple OLS estimates. Other omitted variables may
cause a downward bias in OLS estimates. As an example, higher levels of monopoly distor-
tion in a country’s economy mean higher markups, which tend to deter trade. At the same
time, high levels of monopoly distortion may lead to higher inﬂation rates under discretion
and therefore increase the need to join a currency union as a commitment device to reduce
inﬂation.4 In this paper we revisit previous estimates of the currency-union eﬀect on trade
2The group of West African countries includes Ghana, Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Gambia, and
Guinea. Initial participants in the Southern African currency union will be South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho,
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. Zambia is expected also
to conﬁrm its membership. Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Seychelles, also members of the
Southern African Development Community, will not join the monetary union.
3This group includes Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait.
4See Barro and Tenreyro [2001].
4using the new instrument to address the endogeneity problem.
Trade is not the only interesting outcome of currency unions. Monetary unions might
also alter the extent of synchronization of shocks and the patterns of co-movement among
participants. This consideration is relevant for determining the suitability of the adoption of
a foreign currency or participation into currency unions: countries evaluating the decision to
join or not should take into account the eﬀect that diﬀerent currency arrangements have on
the patterns of co-movement. By adopting a foreign currency or forming a currency union,
countries lose the independence to tailor monetary policy to local needs. If currency unions
lead to higher synchronization of shocks, this change will generate greater consensus over the
direction of monetary policy and reduce the cost of giving up monetary-policy independence.
The opposite will be true if currency unions induce less synchronization. Hence, this paper
also investigates the eﬀects of currency unions on the patterns of co-movement of prices and
real GDP shocks.
In order to construct the IV, we ﬁrst estimate the probability that a given country adopts
the currency of a main anchor country. The estimation of the relationship “client-anchor,”
in the terminology used by Alesina and Barro [2002], is interesting in its own right, as it
elucidates part of the reason why countries adopt a foreign currency or join currency unions.
The IV is then obtained by computing the joint probability that two countries, independently,
adopt the same currency. The underlying assumption in the analysis is that there exist factors
driving the decision to adopt a third country’s currency that are independent of the bilateral
links between two potential clients. In other words, the basic idea is to isolate the motive
that relates to third countries’ currencies and use this motivation as an IV for whether two
5countries do or do not share a common currency.
The main results of this study are the following. First, regarding the motivation to adopt
a foreign anchor’s currency, the probability of adoption increases when i) t h ec l i e n ts p e a k s
the same language as the anchor, ii) the client is geographically closer to the anchor, iii) the
client was a former or current colony of the anchor, iv) t h ec l i e n ti sp o o r e ri nt e r m so fG D P
per capita, v) the client is smaller in terms of population size, and vi) the anchor is richer
in terms of per capita GDP.
Second, the IV estimates of the impact of currency unions on bilateral trade indicate a
signiﬁcant positive eﬀect, supporting previous ﬁndings by Rose [2000] and co-authors. In
other words, endogeneity bias is not responsible for the large eﬀects previously documented.
Third, while OLS estimates indicate that currency unions do not aﬀect the extent of co-
movement of output shocks, the IV estimates suggest that currency unions may decrease the
co-movement of output shocks. This ﬁnding is consistent with the view that currency unions
enhance sectoral specialization, and shocks tend to aﬀect sectors asymmetrically. The bias
in OLS is the result of reverse causality: countries with higher co-movement are more likely
to form currency unions. Finally, the co-movement of price shocks increases with currency
unions, which supports the observation that a large part of the ﬂuctuations in real exchange
r a t e si sd u et oﬂuctuations in nominal exchange rates.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the endogeneity problem in previous
empirical analyses of currency unions. It then discusses how the IV approach can be applied
to study the economic eﬀects of diﬀerent exchange rate arrangements. Section 3 studies the
motivation to link the currency to a main anchor. Section 4 revisits the currency union eﬀect
6on trade. Section 5 estimates the eﬀects of currency unions on the extent of co-movement of
prices and outputs. Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
II Endogeneity bias and a new IV approach
A Endogeneity
T h ee m p i r i c a lw o r ko nt h ee ﬀects of currency unions (or indeed, other exchange rate arrange-
ments) on trade has been framed within the standard “gravity equation” model. The model
states that bilateral trade between a pair of countries increases with the sizes of the coun-
tries and decreases with their distance, broadly construed to include all factors that create
“trade resistance.” The gravity equation is then augmented with a dummy variable indicat-
ing whether or not the countries share the same currency. In his seminal paper in the area,
Rose [2000] reports that bilateral trade between countries that use the same currency is over
two-hundred percent larger than bilateral trade between countries with diﬀerent currencies.
Subsequent papers, including Frankel and Rose [2002], Rose and van Wincoop [2001], and
Glick and Rose [2002], have expanded the analysis and generally conﬁrmed the large enhance-
ment eﬀect of currency unions on trade. Alesina, Barro, and Tenreyro [2002] summarize and
discuss these ﬁndings.
The implicit assumption in the various empirical studies is that currency unions (or, more
generally, exchange rate arrangements) are randomly formed among countries.5 Standard
endogeneity problems, however, can confound the estimates. For example, countries that
would naturally trade more might share characteristics that tend to make them more prone
5For an exception, see Persson [2001].
7to form a currency union. In addition, countries that decide to join a currency union might
also be more likely to foster integration through other means, for example, by encouraging
the harmonization of standards to enhance competition and trade and by reducing regulatory
barriers. These unmeasured characteristics—to the extent that they aﬀect or are correlated
with the propensity to share a common currency and the volume of bilateral trade—will bias
OLS estimates of the currency union eﬀect. The use of country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects employed
in some studies may not eliminate the bias, because a shift at some point in time in trade
volumes may be related to a change in the propensity to use a common currency.
B A new approach
Two countries may be motivated to share a common currency for several reasons. In order
to eliminate the endogeneity bias discussed in the previous section, one needs to isolate the
part of the motivation that is exogenous to the bilateral link between the two countries.
As an example, consider two countries that use a common currency, say Senegal and Togo,
both of which belong to the CFA franc zone. Part of the reason why they share a common
currency is that both countries want to keep the French franc (now the euro) as a nominal
anchor.6 However, other considerations not related to France but to the objective of pro-
moting political and economic integration between Senegal and Togo may have inﬂuenced
the decision to share a common currency. These other considerations are likely to bias OLS
estimates of the eﬀects of currency unions on trade. Hence, separating out the relation with
the anchor provides an instrument to estimate the eﬀect of sharing a common currency on
6The CFA franc has been tied, except for one devaluation, to the French franc, and the French Treasury
has guaranteed the convertibility of CFA francs into French francs.
8bilateral trade.
Alesina and Barro [2002] provide a formal model for the anchor-client relationship in the
context of the currency-union decision. The model shows that countries with lack of internal
discipline for monetary policy (as revealed by a history of high and variable inﬂation) stand
to gain more from giving up their currencies, provided that the anchor country is able to
commit to sound monetary policy. This commitment is best protected when the anchor
is large and the client small (otherwise, the anchor may ﬁnd it advantageous to relinquish
its commitment. In addition, the model shows that, under reasonable assumptions, client
countries beneﬁt more from adopting the currency of an anchor with which they would
naturally trade more, that is, an anchor with which trading costs —other than the ones
associated with the use of diﬀerent currencies— are small. The model also predicts that small
countries beneﬁt more from giving up their currency, and the beneﬁt increases with the size
of the anchor. These features of the relation between clients and anchors are used to guide
the instrumentation.
In order to construct the instrument, we use a probit analysis for all country pairings from
1960 to 1997 with six potential anchors that ﬁt the theoretical characterization of Alesina
and Barro [2002], given the countries’ sizes (GDPs) and records of low and stable inﬂation.
The group of anchors includes Australia, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. The probit regressions include various measures of distance between
clients and anchors (to proxy for trading costs) and the sizes of potential clients and anchors.
Consider a potential client country, denoted by i, which is evaluating the possibility of
adopting the currency of one of the six anchors, denoted by k (k =1 ,2,...,6). The probit
9regression determines the estimated probability p(i,k,t) that client i adopts the currency
of anchor k at time t. If the clients adopt an anchor currency independently, then the joint




The probability Jk(i,j,t) will be high if both countries are “close enough” to the potential
anchor k. The joint probability that, at time t,c o u n t r i e si and j use the same foreign
currency (among the six candidates considered in this analysis)7 is given by the sum of the









The variable J(i,j,t) can be used as an instrument for the currency-union dummy in the
regressions for bilateral trade and co-movements. The underlying assumption for the validity
of the instrument is that the bilateral trade between countries i and j depends on gravity
variables for countries i and j, but not on gravity variables involving third countries, notably
the potential anchors. Gravity variables involving third countries aﬀect the likelihood that
the clients i and j share a common currency and thereby inﬂuence bilateral trade and co-
7This approach neglects the possibility that country i chooses the infeasible outcome of linking simul-
taneously with more than one of the anchors k. We could modify the analysis to rule out these outcomes.
However, the results would not be aﬀected, because the probability of choosing two anchors simultaneously
is negligible, given that each individual probability is itself small.
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10movements between i and j through that channel. The assumption requires that these
variables not inﬂuence the bilateral trade or the extent of co-movement between i and j
through other channels.
As mentioned in the introduction, the endogeneity problem is pervasive in the literature
studying the economic eﬀects of exchange rate arrangements. Although this study focuses
on the economic eﬀects of currency unions, the methodology can also be applied to the study
of diﬀerent exchange rate arrangements. For example, consider the problem of estimating
the eﬀect of nominal-exchange rate variability on bilateral trade (or any other bilateral
outcome for which exchange rates cannot be considered exogenous). One could, in principle,
isolate the part of the exchange-rate variability that relates to the independent decision to
peg (explicitly or de facto) t oal o w - i n ﬂation currency to overcome the lack of discipline in
monetary policy.9 In this context, one could instrument the extent of variability between
two countries using the likelihood that two countries independently target the exchange rate
of a common nominal anchor.
III Determinants of currency unions: The anchor-client
relationship
The results of the probit regressions are in Table 2. The sample consists of all country pairs
that include the six candidate anchors: Australia, France, Germany, Japan, U.K., and U.S.
The data come from Glick and Rose [2002], except for real GDP per capita and population,
9The form of the peg—and, hence, the dividing line for whether a country is a ﬁx e ro raﬂoater—can vary.
Crawling pegs, ﬁxed exchange rates with bands of diﬀerent widths, currency boards, and currency unions
are illustrations of the range of options.
11which come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The equations are for
annual data, include year eﬀects, and allow for clustering over time for country pairs. The
dependent variable is based on countries sharing a common currency.10 The independent
variables, as mentioned before, are motivated by the model of currency-union decision for-
mulated by Alesina and Barro [2002]. We incl u d ev a r i o u sm e a s u r e so fd i s t a n c et h a ta r e
typically included in the gravity equation literature, and diﬀerent measures of size for both
the anchor and the client. Summary statistics for the data used in the probit equation are
presented in Table 1, Panel B.
The ﬁrst two columns in Table 2 show the estimated coeﬃcients and their corresponding
(clustered) standard errors. The third column shows the marginal eﬀects evaluated at the
mean values of all variables. Since in this sample only 3.4 percent of the pairs share a
common currency, evaluating the eﬀects at the mean is almost equivalent to evaluating at
the mean of the sub-sample of pairs that do not share a common currency. In other words,
the “mean” country in this sample is far from considering the adoption of a foreign currency.
Given that the marginal eﬀects are highly nonlinear, we also computed the marginal eﬀects
at the mean of the subsample of pairs sharing a common currency. The relevant eﬀects for
t h em a r g i n a lc o u n t r y ,t h a ti s ,t h ec o u n t r yt h a ti si n d i ﬀerent about adopting the currency of
a potential anchor, must lie somewhere in between.
Table 2 shows that the probability that a country uses the currency of one of the main
10We depart from the deﬁnition of currency unions in Glick and Rose [2002] by treating the CFA countries
as in a currency union with France. The main reason to do so is because France has guaranteed free
convertibility of the CFA franc into French francs (and now into euros), and the CFA franc has been tied
to the French franc, except for one devaluation in 1994. The French franc and currently the euro can and
do circulate in the CFA zone. Likewise, we treat the countries in the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union as
in a monetary union with the United Kingdom before 1976 and with the United States after that. In both
periods, they mantained a strict peg with the British pound and the American dollar, respectively.
12anchors at a given point in time increases when i) t h ec l i e n ts p e a k st h es a m el a n g u a g ea s
the anchor, ii) the client is geographically closer to the anchor, iii) the client was a former
or current colony of the anchor, iv) t h ec l i e n ti sp o o r e ri nt e r m so fG D Pp e rc a p i t a ,v) the
client is smaller in terms of population size, and vi) the anchor is richer — among the six
anchors considered— in terms of per capita GDP. Notice that the existence of regional trade
agreements tends to decrease the propensity to form currency unions.11 Other geographical
characteristics, such as access to land or being an island, do not seem relevant for adopting
a foreign currency, once the other control variables are included.
IV Trade
Table 3 shows the regressions of bilateral trade on the currency-union dummy and the various
gravity characteristics. The regressions use annual data from 1960 to 1997 for all pairs of
countries for which data are available. The dependent variable is the logarithm of bilateral
trade.12 The variables included as controls are standard in the gravity equation literature;
they comprise various measures of distance and size.13 T h es y s t e m si n c l u d ey e a re ﬀects and
11One interpretation of the negative relation can be the following. Well-functioning economies are less
likely to use import tariﬀs and seignioriage as sources of ﬁscal revenue. Hence, these economies will be more
likely to sign free trade agreements. At the same time, a smaller need for seignioriage revenues reduces
the need for commitment (because the inﬂationary bias stemming from the incentives to monetize budget
deﬁcit is smaller). A lower inﬂationary bias decreases the value of currency unions as commitment devices
to temper inﬂation. This may explain why, in the data, countries that do not need currency unions as
an external commitment are also more likely to sign regional trade agreements. Including the EMU might
change this historical pattern, as countries in the EMU have previously signed free-trade agreements and
most likely, the search for commitment was not the main motivation for the union.
12The logarithmic speciﬁcation leaves out observations for which trade is zero. While this omission should
not, in principle, bias the coeﬃcients in any particular direction, it suggests that the standard speciﬁcation
used in the literature is not entirely appropriate. For comparability, we stick to the framework used in the
literature. The results, however, are similar if we include the zeroes and estimate the gravity equation using
ln(trade + c) as the dependent variable, for small values of c.
13Information on bilateral trade, distance, contiguity, access to water, language, colonial relationships,
regional trade agreements and currency unions comes, as before, from Glick and Rose [2002]. Data on real
per capita GDP and population come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. As already
13allow the error terms to be correlated over time for a given country pair. Summary statistics
for the data are presented in Table 1, Panel A. The second and fourth columns include
country-ﬁxed eﬀects, which control for remoteness and other country-speciﬁcf a c t o r st h a t
inhibit trade, as in Rose and van Wincoop [2001].
Most of the gravity variables have the expected signs: geographical proximity, common
border, access to land, common language, common colonial history, and size all increase
the volume of trade between two countries. When country-ﬁxed eﬀects are included, how-
ever, free trade agreements and population do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect trade, and the island
dummies have a negative, rather than positive, eﬀect on trade.
In the OLS system, the estimated coeﬃcient on the currency-union dummy is 0.67 without
country-ﬁxed eﬀects, and 0.96 with country-ﬁxed eﬀects. These results are consistent with
Rose [2000], despite the diﬀerent deﬁnition of currency union used in this study.14 In the
instrumental-variable speciﬁcation, the estimated eﬀect of currency unions on bilateral trade
becomes even larger: the coeﬃcient on the dummy variable is 0.95 without country-ﬁxed
eﬀects and 1.9 with country-ﬁxed eﬀects.15 Hence, the results indicate that endogeneity is not
the reason for the large eﬀects documented by Rose [2000] and co-authors. If anything, OLS
underestimates the impact on bilateral trade.16 Barro and Tenreyro [2000] oﬀer a possible
explanation for the negative bias. Economies with higher degrees of monopoly distortion and
explained, the currency union dummy is modiﬁed to reﬂect the link between the CFA franc to the French
franc and the link of the Eastern Caribbean dollar to the British pound before 1976 and the American dollar
thereafter.
14The estimated eﬀect of the currency-union dummy is larger when using Rose’s stricter deﬁnition. The
estimated coeﬃcient on the currency-union dummy using Rose’s deﬁnition is 0.99, without ﬁxed eﬀects and
1.14 with ﬁxed eﬀects.
15The corresponding values, using Rose’s deﬁnition of currency union, are 1.57 without country-ﬁxed
eﬀects and 3.30 with country-ﬁxed eﬀects.
16The p-values from a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, reported at the bottom of Table 4, indicate that endo-
geneity of the currency union variable has detrimental eﬀects on simple OLS estimates, and the IV technique
is required.
14therefore higher markups feature lower trade (lower than would be predicted by the standard
gravity equation). At the same time, these economies are more likely to join currency unions
to eliminate the inﬂationary bias stemming from the high distortion.
The trade eﬀects are extremely large and one should exercise caution before generalizing
the results. In this sample, most of the countries in currency unions are small and poor
clients for which the enhancement eﬀect on trade can be substantial (especially if they start
at low levels of trade). Moreover, the logarithmic speciﬁcation dictated by the theory gives
a larger weight to observations with small bilateral trade volumes. Therefore, as Rose [2000]
warns, the results cannot be directly extrapolated to more developed countries.
V Synchronization of shocks
Currency unions might alter the extent of synchronization of shocks. Since this synchro-
nization inﬂuences the suitability of currency adoption, a country deciding whether or not
to join a union should consider the eﬀect of the union on the patterns of co-movement.17 A
positive response of co-movements to currency unions will lead to a higher level of consensus
over the direction of monetary policy and will thereby reduce the cost of relinquishing an
independent currency. A negative response of co-movements will have the opposite eﬀect,
generating a larger loss associated with the lack of monetary policy independence.
In this section, we investigate the eﬀect of currency unions on the extent of co-movements
of real GDP and prices. As suggested before, the response of co-movements to currency
unions can be positive or negative. On the one hand, sharing a common currency eliminates
17See also Frankel and Rose [1998] for a discussion of the endogeneity of the optimum currency area
criteria. They remark that the criteria for optimality of currency unions should be considered ex post.
15the ﬂuctuations in relative prices driven by nominal exchange rate variation and, hence, can
lead to higher price co-movement. In addition, the common monetary shocks will induce
higher co-movement in consumption behavior and production decisions. On the other hand,
by lowering transaction costs and eliminating exchange rate uncertainty, currency unions
might lead to greater specialization. Specialization can take place within a given sector (for
example, diﬀerent countries producing diﬀerent models of cars) or between sectors (for ex-
ample, one country produces cars and the other produces agricultural goods). To the extent
that shocks are sector-speciﬁc and common to all countries, the second type of specialization
will lead to less co-movement of shocks.18
The standard omitted-variable problem can also arise in the estimation of the eﬀect of
currency unions on the extent of co-movement of shocks. As already mentioned, currency
unions are generally accompanied by parallel eﬀorts to promote integration. For example, two
countries adopting a common currency will tend also to lower tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers,
which are poorly measured in the data. These lower regulatory barriers might increase
the co-movement of shocks between two countries and, hence, simple OLS estimates will
attribute too much credit to the use of a common currency.
To compute bilateral co-movement of price and output, we follow Alesina, Barro and
Tenreyro [2002]. Relative prices are measured using the real exchange rate calculated from
GDP deﬂators. The measure used is the purchasing power parity (PPP) for GDP divided by
the U.S. dollar exchange rate.19 This measure indicates the price level in country i relative
18Krugman [1993] formulated this argument in the context of the discussion of the potential unsustain-
ability of the European Monetary Union.
19Pi = PPP of GDPi
Ex.rate measures how many units of U.S. output can be purchased with one unit of country
i’s output, that is, it measures the relative price of country i’s output with respect to that of the United
States. By deﬁnition, this price is always one when i is the United States.
16to that in the United States, Pi,t/PUS,t. The relative price between countries i and j is then
computed by dividing the value for country i by that for country j.
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The estimated residual, ˆ εtij, measures the part of the relative price that could not be pre-
dicted from the two prior values of relative prices. The extent of co-movement is then
measured as the negative of the root-mean-squared error:
CPij ≡−







Similarly, the extent of co-movement of output comes from the estimated residuals from the
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The estimated residuals, ˆ utij, measure the unpredictable movements in relative per capita
output. The measure of the extent of co-movement is analogous to the one used for prices:
VY ij ≡−





This measure of co-movement is more relevant from the perspective of monetary pol-
17icy than a correlation of output movements. Consider two countries i and j whose output
movements are highly correlated but where the countries exhibit substantially diﬀerent vari-
abilities of output. Suppose that country i is the one with the lower variability. In this
case, the correlation of output movements will be high, but the monetary policy response
desired by country i will be insuﬃcient for country j. In other words, a high correlation
is not suﬃcient to ensure that the desired monetary policies are similar.. The measure of
co-movement used in this paper captures more adequately the criterion for suitability.
Data on PPPs for the GDPs come from the Penn World Tables and are complemented
with the World Bank’s World Development Indicators when the ﬁrst source is missing. Data
on real per capita GDP come from the World Development Indicators.
T a b l e4s h o w st h ee ﬀect of currency unions on the co-movements of prices. We include all
the controls typically incorporated in gravity regressions, that is, various measures of distance
a n ds i z e .T h el o g i cf o ri n c l u d i n gt h es a m ec o n t r o l si st h a tt h ef o r c e st h a td e t e r m i n et r a d e
will also aﬀect the extent of price-arbitrage between countries. There are, however, some
diﬀerences in the way that these forces can inﬂuence the outcomes. For example, countries
that are close in terms of the gravity variables may be motivated to specialize in diﬀerent
products. In this case, nearby countries will be subject to diﬀerent sectoral shocks and will
likely exhibit lower co-movements of prices. In any event, it seems prudent to control for the
gravity variables.
In the co-movement equations, the sample consists of one observation (estimated for the
period 1960-1997) on each country pair, for pairs that have at least twenty observations.
The regressors, as well as the instrumental variables, are the averages over the period.20 The
20For GDP per capita and population, we use the value in 1985 as opposed to the average, because the
18ﬁrst two columns report the estimates generated by OLS, and the last two columns show the
IV estimates. As before, the second and fourth columns include country-ﬁxed eﬀects.
The regressions show that price co-movement rises with regional trade agreements and
falls with geographical distance. Sharing a border does not aﬀect the co-movement, once
distance is taken into account. Speaking the same language and sharing the same colonizer
have positive, but small eﬀects on co-movement. In the IV speciﬁcation, these eﬀects become
negligible. An ex-colony and its colonizer tend to exhibit less co-movement of prices, possibly
because colonies tended to specialize in products that were scarce in the colonizer’s land.
Price co-movement also rises with the various measures of country size, except for population.
However, the country ﬁxed eﬀects capture most of the size eﬀects—hence, these size eﬀects
become statistically insigniﬁcant.
Table 4 shows that sharing a common currency signiﬁcantly increases price co-movement,
with an estimated OLS coeﬃcient of 0.062 when country-ﬁxed eﬀects are excluded, and 0.045
when ﬁxed eﬀects are included. These estimates are large relative to the mean of the co-
movement variable (the negative of the root mean squared error of the AR process described
before) of -0.16. The instrumental-variable regression indicates even more substantial eﬀects
than the ones generated by OLS. The estimates are 0.15 without country-ﬁxed eﬀects and
0.07 with ﬁxed eﬀects.
The p-values from a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test are reported at the bottom of Table 4.
The null hypothesis that an OLS estimator of the model would yield consistent estimates is
rejected. In other words, endogeneity of the currency-union variable has detrimental eﬀects
averages are missing for some countries. Using diﬀerent years for GDP or population does not alter the main
results.
19on simple OLS estimates, and the IV technique is required. As mentioned before, the positive
eﬀect of currency unions on the co-movement of price shocks is most likely associated with the
decrease in nominal exchange rate volatility stemming from the use of a common currency.
The co-movement of output shocks is studied in Table 5. One diﬀerence from the results
on price co-movements is that the inclusion of ﬁxed eﬀects makes a diﬀerence in the estimated
coeﬃcients of most “distance” variables. For instance, although free-trade agreements and
geographical proximity seem to increase the co-movement of outputs (columns 1 and 3)
when country ﬁxed eﬀects are excluded, the eﬀects become statistically insigniﬁcant when
the ﬁxed eﬀects are added. In contrast, although sharing a border does not aﬀect output
co-movements in the speciﬁcation without ﬁxed eﬀects, sharing a border does increase the co-
movement when ﬁxed eﬀects are included. Henceforth, we comment on the results with ﬁxed
eﬀects, as they provide more adequate controls for remoteness and multilateral resistance.
Speaking the same language and sharing the same colonizer increase the co-movement of
output, but the ex-colony-colonizer variable does not aﬀect the extent of co-movement. Size,
measured by GDP per capita and geographical area, tends to increase the co-movement.
However, a rise in the population of the larger country decreases co-movement.
In the OLS estimation, the eﬀect of currency unions on output co-movement is insigniﬁ-
cant. However, in the instrumental-variable estimation, when ﬁxed eﬀects are included, the
currency union eﬀect becomes negative and signiﬁcant at the ten percent level. The Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test also prefers the IV estimator over the OLS when country ﬁxed eﬀects are
included (the p-value is 5 percent).21
21When ﬁxed eﬀects are excluded, however, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test does not reject the hypothesis
of exogeneity.
20The negative eﬀect of currency unions on the extent of co-movement of outputs could
reﬂect a positive eﬀect of currency unions on sectoral specialization, which can then lead to a
decrease in the extent of co-movement, as Krugman (1993) suggested. The eﬀect—in absolute
values—is not as substantial as the one found for price co-movement: the estimated coeﬃcient
is -0.003, whereas the mean of this variable (the negative of the root-mean-squared error
described above) is -0.06. This eﬀect, however, might be diﬀerent for developed countries
forming a currency union if, for example, developed countries tend to specialize in the same
industries (e.g., diﬀerent industrialized countries produce diﬀerent types of cars). In this
case, countries will tend to be exposed to similar sectoral shocks and integration will lead to
higher co-movement.22
VI Conclusion
This paper proposes a new instrumental variable to study the eﬀects of diﬀerent exchange rate
arrangements on economic outcomes. We apply the methodology to investigate the impact of
currency unions on bilateral trade and the extent of co-movements of prices and outputs. The
instrument relies on the idea that one reason why two countries share a common currency is
the attractiveness of a third country’s currency as an anchor. The validity of the instrument
requires that the motivation to adopt an external anchor’s currency is exogenous to the
bilateral link between two potential client-countries. The paper shows that the probability
that a client adopts the currency of a main anchor increases when the client is geographically
close, speaks the same language, and shares a colonial relationship with the anchor. It also
22See Frankel and Rose [1998] for a study on the relationship between trade and business cycles using
OECD countries.
21increases when the client is smaller and poorer and when the anchor is richer. The likelihood
that two countries share a common currency is calculated from the probability that each
of them, independently, uses the currency of a third country. This likelihood serves as an
instrument for the common currency dummy in the estimation of the economic eﬀects of
monetary unions.
The IV approach is used to revisit the eﬀect of currency unions on trade and to investigate
the eﬀect of currency unions on the extent of co-movement of prices and outputs. Three
main ﬁndings follow. First, currency unions signiﬁcantly increase bilateral trade, a result
consistent with previous ﬁndings by Rose [2000] and co-authors. This ﬁnding suggests that
the large trade eﬀect found previously for currency unions is not due to endogeneity bias.
Second, currency unions signiﬁcantly increase the extent of price co-movement. This response
most likely reﬂects the elimination of nominal exchange rate volatility. Third, the IV results
suggest that currency unions might decrease the extent of co-movement of output, possibly
as a consequence of higher sectoral specialization. Simple OLS estimation, however, fails to
reveal this negative relationship.
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24Variable Mean Std. Dev
Log of Trade 9.949 3.543
Currency union 0.022 0.147
Regional trade agreement 0.016 0.124
Log of distance 8.199 0.826
Contiguity dummy 0.026 0.158
One landlocked country in pair dummy 0.206 0.405
Two landlocked countries in pair dummy 0.014 0.116
One island in pair dummy 0.290 0.454
Two islands in pair dummy 0.038 0.191
Common language dummy 0.215 0.411
Ex-colony-colonizer dummy 0.021 0.143
Common colonizer dummy 0.094 0.291
Current colony (or territory) dummy 0.002 0.041
Min(log of per capita GDP in pair) 6.958 1.277
Max(log of per capita GDP in pair) 8.880 1.253
Min(log of population in pair) 14.727 1.643
Min(log of area in pair) 16.974 1.495
Min(log of area in pair) 10.533 2.339
Max(log of area in pair) 13.204 1.731
Year 83.203 10.189
Co-movement of output shocks -0.061 0.023
Co-movement of price shocks -0.156 0.090
Table 1
Panel A. Summary Statistics. Whole Sample
N=185,580 except for co-movement of output shocks (N=6,923) and price shocks (N=7,218). See notes 
of tables 3 and 4.Variable Mean Std. Dev
Currency union 0.034 0.180
Regional trade agreement 0.028 0.166
Log of distance 8.371 0.775
Contiguity dummy 0.022 0.146
One landlocked country in pair dummy 0.173 0.378
Two landlocked countries in pair dummy 0.000 0.000
One island in pair dummy 0.402 0.490
Two islands in pair dummy 0.066 0.249
Common language dummy 0.209 0.407
Ex-colony-colonizer dummy 0.090 0.286
Current colony (or territory) dummy 0.041 0.104
Min(log of per capita GDP in pair) 7.488 1.479
Max(log of per capita GDP in pair) 9.915 0.349
Min(log of population in pair) 15.155 1.850
Min(log of area in pair) 18.116 0.854
Min(log of area in pair) 11.192 2.261
Max(log of area in pair) 14.142 1.522
Year 80.772 10.825
N=29,988. This sample includes all country pairings from 1960 to 1997 that include one of the six 
anchors considered in the study.
Table 1 (continued)








Regional trade agreement dummy -0.650** 0.329 -0.0002 -0.211
Log of distance (km) -1.152*** 0.202 -0.0010 -0.439
Contiguity dummy -1.748** 0.698 0.0000 -0.372
Landlocked client dummy -0.499 0.338 0.0000 -0.177
One island in pair dummy -0.262 0.317 0.0000 -0.098
Two islands in pair dummy 0.402 0.375 0.0010 0.158
Common language dummy 1.136*** 0.306 0.0040 0.346
Ex-colony-colonizer dummy 2.217*** 0.262 0.0660 0.627
Current colony (or territory) dummy 0.520 0.384 0.0010 0.204
Min (log-per capita GDPs in pair ) -0.331*** 0.088 -0.0003 -0.126
Max (log-per capita GDPs in pair ) 1.907*** 0.456 0.0020 0.727
Min (log-populations in pair ) -0.385*** 0.086 -0.0003 -0.147
Max (log-populations in pair ) 0.111 0.147 0.0000 0.042
Min (log-areas in pair ) 0.021 0.070 0.0000 0.008




Propensity to Adopt the Currency of Main Anchors
Note: The sample consists of country-pairs that include the six candidate anchors: Australia, France, Germany, 
Japan, UK, and US. The equations are for annual data, include year effects, and allow for clustering over time for 
country pairs. Clustered standard errors are shown in the second column.  The definition of currency union treats 
the CFA franc countries as linked to France and treats the ECCA countries as linked to the US since 1976 and to 
the UK before 1976.  The mean of the currency-union dummy for this sample is 0.034. The third column shows the 
marginal effect, evaluated at the sample mean, of each explanatory variable on the estimated probability of a 
currency union. The fourth column shows the marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the subsample of countries 
in currency unions.  For dummy variables, the effect refers to a shift from zero to one.* significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.OLS OLS IV IV
0.671** 0.962** 0.954** 1.912**
(0.112) (0.113) (0.235) (0.251)
0.450** 0.085 0.450** 0.100
(0.157) (0.177) (0.159) (0.179)
-1.147** -1.311** -1.142** -1.294**
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
0.568** 0.366** 0.565** 0.372**
(0.131) (0.133) (0.131) (0.131)
-0.596** -2.403** -0.598** -2.496**
(0.040) (0.402) (0.040) (0.401)
-0.699** -4.277** -0.700** -4.458**
(0.116) (0.808) (0.116) (0.806)
-0.011 -1.807** -0.010 -2.766**
(0.044) (0.487) (0.044) (0.566)
0.682** -2.923** 0.680** -4.843**
(0.108) (0.969) (0.109) (1.128)
0.447** 0.296** 0.437** 0.257**
(0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.048)
0.850** 0.650** 0.817** 0.533**
(0.075) (0.071) (0.082) (0.076)
1.174** 1.290** 1.135** 1.165**
(0.132) (0.128) (0.141) (0.134)
1.317** 1.388** 1.263** 1.225**
(0.195) (0.318) (0.189) (0.306)
0.908** 1.156** 0.908** 1.146**
(0.014) (0.036) (0.014) (0.036)
1.072** 1.185** 1.073** 1.178**
(0.016) (0.039) (0.016) (0.039)
0.978** -0.054 0.980** -0.043
(0.014) (0.066) (0.014) (0.066)
0.955** -0.088 0.957** -0.065
(0.016) (0.068) (0.016) (0.068)
-0.047** 0.196** -0.048** 0.200**
(0.011) (0.042) (0.011) (0.042)
-0.064** 0.170** -0.065** 0.171**
(0.013) (0.037) (0.013) (0.037)
Country fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 185580 185580 185580 185580
R-squared 0.66 0.71 0.66 0.71
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of Exogeneity, p-value 0.150 0.000
Note: The equations use annual data from 1960 to 1997, include year effects, and allow for clustering of the error terms over time 
for country pairs. The dependent variable is ln(trade). The definition of currency union treats the CFA franc countries as linked to 
France and the ECCA countries as linked to the UK before 1976 and to the US after 1976. Country effects refer to each member of 
the pair (not to a country pair). The IV is described in the text. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.







One landlocked country in pair dummy
Two landlocked countries in pair dummy
One island in pair dummy
Max(log of per capita GDP in pair)
Min(log of population in pair)
Max(log of population in pair)
Two islands in pair dummy
Common language dummy
Min(log of area in pair)
Common colonizer dummy
Ex-colony-colonizer dummy
Current colony (or territory) dummy
Min(log of per capita GDP in pair)OLS OLS IV IV
0.0621*** 0.0454*** 0.1483*** 0.0691***
(0.0055) (0.0027) (0.0142) (0.0052)
0.0100 0.0175*** 0.0118 0.0183***
(0.0200) (0.0045) (0.0200) (0.0045)
-0.0036** -0.0027*** -0.0010 -0.0021***
(0.0020) (0.0065) (0.0018) (0.0007)
-0.0038 0.0042* -0.0066 0.0036
(0.0076) (0.0023) (0.0078) (0.0023)
0.0144*** 0.0166*** 0.0146*** 0.0160***
(0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0020)
0.0290*** 0.0325*** 0.0285*** 0.0303***
(0.0059) (0.0042) (0.0060) (0.0040)
0.0176*** 0.0139*** 0.0173*** 0.0127***
(0.0026) (0.0033) (0.0027) (0.0030)
0.0431*** 0.0353*** 0.0430*** 0.0331***
(0.0040) (0.0064) (0.0042) (0.0064)
0.0056** 0.0021** 0.0032 0.0012
(0.0024) (0.0009) (0.0025) (0.0009)
0.0090** 0.0030** -0.0037 -0.0009
(0.0036) (0.0014) (0.0044) (0.0017)
-0.0022 -0.0075 -0.0182 -0.0115***
(0.0074) (0.0020) (0.0088) (0.0024)
0.0234 0.0196* 0.0257 0.0198
(0.0197) (0.0115) (0.0254) (0.0127)
0.0181*** 0.0089*** 0.0184*** 0.0091***
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0055)
0.0118*** 0.0007 0.0120*** 0.0089
(0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0055)
-0.0054*** -0.0010 -0.0052*** -0.0007
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0009)
0.0004 -0.0010 0.0009 -0.0005
(0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0010)
0.0060*** 0.0010 0.0057*** 0.0010
(0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0007)
0.0041*** 0.0012 0.0036*** 0.0010
(0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0009)
Country fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 7218 7218 7218 7218
R-squared 0.16 0.93 0.15 0.93
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of Exogeneity, p-value 0.000 0.000
Table 4
Co-movement of Price Shocks
Note: Co-movements are calculated for the period 1960-1997 as indicated in the text. The regressions 
include only pairs of countries with 20 or more observations of relative prices. Per capita GDP and 
population correspond to the year 1985. The remaining explanatory variables refer to the averages over 
the period. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%.
Max(log of population in pair)
Min(log of area in pair)





One landlocked country in pair dummy
Two landlocked countries in pair dummy
One island in pair dummy
Current colony (or territory) dummy
Min(log of per capita GDP in pair)
Max(log of per capita GDP in pair)
Min(log of population in pair)
Two islands in pair dummy
Common language dummy
Common colonizer dummy
Ex-colony-colonizer dummyOLS OLS IV IV
0.0037 0.0000 0.0018 -0.0033*
(0.0026) (0.0011) (0.0052) (0.0019)
0.0268*** 0.0012 0.0269*** 0.0013
(0.0027) (0.0013) (0.0027) (0.0013)
-0.0017*** -0.0003 -0.0017*** -0.0004*
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0002)
-0.0017 0.0040*** -0.0017 0.0040***
(0.0020) (0.0009) (0.0020) (0.0008)
0.0047*** -0.0191*** 0.0047*** -0.0189***
(0.0007) (0.0013) (0.0007) (0.0013)
0.0082*** -0.0388*** 0.0082*** -0.0383***
(0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0020) (0.0026)
0.0073*** -0.0491*** 0.0073*** -0.0489***
(0.0007) (0.0024) (0.0007) (0.0011)
0.0131*** -0.0980*** 0.0131*** -0.0973***
(0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0023)
-0.0008 0.0007** -0.0007 0.0009**
(0.0009) (0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0003)
-0.0021 0.0021*** -0.0019 0.0026***
(0.0013) (0.0005) (0.0014) (0.0006)
0.0051** -0.0007 0.0053** -0.0001
(0.0021) (0.0007) (0.0022) (0.0007)
-0.0109 -0.0024 -0.0108 -0.0022
(0.0111) (0.0023) (0.0110) (0.0002)
0.0044*** 0.0152*** 0.0044*** 0.0152***
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002)
0.0029*** 0.0139*** 0.0029*** 0.0139***
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002)
0.0056*** -0.0003 0.0056*** -0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002)
0.0035*** -0.0015*** 0.0035*** -0.0015***
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002)
-0.0010*** 0.0088*** -0.0010*** 0.0089***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
-0.0006** 0.0090*** -0.0006** 0.0089***
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Country fixed effects No Yes No  Yes
Observations 7610 7610 7610 7610
R-squared 0.21 0.91 0.21 0.91
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of Exogeneity, p-value 0.760 0.050
Regional trade agreement
Log of distance
One landlocked country in pair dummy
Two landlocked countries in pair dummy
Min(log of area in pair)
Max(log of area in pair)
Contiguity dummy
Note: Co-movements are calculated for the period 1960-1997 as indicated in the text. The regressions 
include only pairs of countries with 20 or more observations of relative output. Per capita GDP and 
population correspond to the year 1985. The remaining explanatory variables refer to the averages over 
the period. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%.
Max(log of population in pair)
One island in pair dummy
Two islands in pair dummy
Table 5
Min(log of per capita GDP in pair)
Max(log of per capita GDP in pair)




Current colony (or territory) dummy
Co-movement of Output Shocks
Currency union